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The resolution of complex legal issues outside formal litigation
channels is a popular subject at conferences and in academic jour-
nals. Less attractive, perhaps because it is within the bounds of tradi-
tional legal process, but often without quite the degree of delay and
expense normally associated with it, is the resolution of a case after
filing a complaint by means of a judicially approved settlement in the
form of a consent decree. Such a decree has the advantage of judicial
enforceability often lacking in other forms of alternative dispute res-
olution. This enforceability, together with the consent of the parties,
makes the consent decree a form of contract with the extra oomph of
a judicial decree, taking it several steps beyond mere settlement of
litigation.
The nature of the consent decree is critical to an analysis of its
use in settling complex environmental and town planning law dis-
putes. Is it a contract or is it a judgment? According to some authori-
ties, it is merely a private contract between the litigating parties."
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1. See, e.g., United States v. Amour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971); 3 ABRAHAM C.
FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 1350, at 2773 (5th ed. 1925); Larry Kramer,
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Others view it as a judgment of the court.2 According to one recent
commentator, the "dominant modern view is that a consent decree is
a hybrid, with elements of both contract and judgment." 3 As the
commentator observes, this view would require a court to decide
whether a particular problem implicates the contract or the judg-
ment/decree aspects of the consent decree.4
The problem assumes critical importance in examination of the
judicial process upon which it may be engrafted. It takes very little
time or money to merely file a lawsuit as compared to the enormous
expense of motions, discovery, pretrial preparation, and the trial it-
self. Parties are therefore likely to attempt settlement at some stage
of the pretrial proceedings, perhaps as early as the filing of a com-
plaint. Negotiating a settlement does not require the supervision or
permission of a judge; settling by means of a court order agreed to by
the parties - a consent decree - does.
A settlement by consent decree has several advantages. First, if
either party breaches the agreement, the other party can enforce it
by means of contempt sanctions without having to file an indepen-
dent lawsuit. No waiting and no expense of a separate suit is re-
quired. Second, the court will likely take an active role in seeing that
the settlement is carried out. This is particularly true in complicated
settlements that are to be worked out over a period of years, such as
the settlement of environmental litigation involving the implementa-
tion of pollution controls either by rule or by construction of facili-
ties. Third, the consent decree may be more easily modified during
the course of settlement activity than a simple contract. Fourth, the
consent decree, as a judgment of a court, is res judicata, binding the
parties so they may not file a fresh lawsuit. Finally, from the perspec-
tive of the court rather than the litigants, the consent decree has the
obvious advantage of calendar-clearing; it facilitates the settlement of
complex litigation without lengthy trials even though court supervi-
sion of its terms may be necessary.5 In short, the consent decree is
2. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932); 1B JAMES W. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 0.409[5] (2d ed. Supp. 1991-92).
3. Kramer, supra note 1, at 324; United States v. ITT Continental Bakers, 420 U.S. 223,
236 n.10 (1975).
4. Kramer, supra note 1, at 324.
5. E.g., Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of consent decree to require
replacement of low- and moderate-income housing lost through new freeway construction);
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (court supervi-
sion under consent decree, after protracted litigation, requiring Pennsylvania to establish a pro-
gram for the inspection and maintenance of vehicle emission systems under the Clean Air Act);
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cheaper and more expeditious for the parties, and it ends complex
litigation for the court.'
Used increasingly in the settlement of complex environmental
and land use disputes, the consent decree nevertheless raises several
troublesome issues. First, to what extent can the consent decree au-
thorize local government action that is contrary to normal legal pro-
cedures? Does it make a difference if the court issuing the consent
decree is a federal or state court? Does the subject matter of the liti-
gation make a difference? Does it make a difference if the abbrevi-
ated or eliminated legal process is enshrined in state statute or local
ordinance, regulation, or rule?
Second, what is the effect of a consent decree on the due process
rights of non-parties, such as intervenors? Can a consent decree in-
volving only the local government and the property owner eliminate a
public hearing that would normally be required for a zoning change
or a particular project approval?
Part II of this Article places these questions in the context of the
major and lengthy federal housing discrimination litigation in the
Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, which was eventually settled by
means of a hotly contested, but eventually upheld, consent decree.
Part III focuses on the first question presented above: can parties
agree to bypass legal procedures by means of consent decrees? Fed-
Gatreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (consent decrees used for protracted housing
discrimination litigation).
6. Kramer, supra note 1, at 325-27.
7. See Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988) (consent decree to provide replace-
ment of low- and moderate-income housing destroyed in new highway construction); New York
v. Adm'r, United States EPA, 710 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983) (consent decree to settle Clean Air
Act litigation involving multiple parties); United States v. City of Fort Smith, 760 F.2d 231 (8th
Cir. 1985) (consent decree requiring city to achieve sewage effluent limits under Clean Water
Act); Monsanto Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 753 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1985) (consent decree establishing
scientific panel to aid complex administration of company registration and competitive activi-
ties under Pesticide Act); Kilroy v. Ruckelshaus, 738 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984) (city required to
terminate ocean disposal of sludge under national pollutant discharge elimination system provi-
sions of Clean Water Act); City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 824 F.2d 531 (7th
Cir. 1987) (PCB disposal under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (combined CERCLA
and RCRA action); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Commonwealth of Pa.,
762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1985) (consent decree involving citizens groups as well as the United
States and the state, over enforcement of Clean Air Act provisions); City of Bloomington v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 824 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1987) (citizen intervention in a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act proceeding involving disposal of PCBs); Suburban O'Hare Comm'n
v. Dole, 787 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1986) (consent decree to resolve airport expansion issues, formal-
izing role of concerned citizens groups); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629 (1st Cir.
1989) (consent decrees in settlement of CERCLA litigation involving over 300 parties).
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eral and state courts reach somewhat different conclusions, which
may encourage forum shopping for those opposed to, or favoring,
elimination of lengthy process by means of the consent decree. Part
IV analyzes the rights of third parties who may be affected, if not
fully bound, by a consent decree that is substantially adverse to their
interests. This Article concludes in Part V that the consent decree is
a useful mechanism for settling complex environmental and land use
litigation, but there is a danger that it might be used to shorten or
eliminate state and local procedures, particularly those designed to
protect the rights of third parties.
II. THE PROBLEMS RESTATED
The problems of conflict with state and local laws and due pro-
cess rights of third parties are nowhere more starkly presented than
in the tedious litigation in Metropolitan Housing Development Cor-
poration v. Village of Arlington Heights8 over the zoning of land for
low-income housing in the Chicago suburb of Arlington Heights, Illi-
nois. In the last of the federal district court 9 and court of appeals 0
decisions, a major issue was the effect of a consent decree on the
rights of intervenors who alleged, inter alia, that the decree imper-
missibly interfered with their due process rights and completely cir-
cumvented statutory procedures in connection with the annexation of
unincorporated land to an Illinois municipal corporation. The courts'
stake in settling litigation and the courts' strong preference to end
discriminatory housing practices, together with evidence of due pro-
cess afforded intervenors (though different in time and substance
from what Illinois statutes provided), resulted in the federal courts
upholding the consent decree. Because the courts thoroughly dealt
with the two aforementioned problems in a consent decree context
and because the case involved zoning as well as housing, the Arling-
ton Heights case is worth discussing in some detail.
A. The Facts of the Case
In 1975, Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
8. 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Il1. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd and re-
manded, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), on remand, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978), on remand, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979), and aff'd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir.
1980).
9. Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
10. Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
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(MHDC), a nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose of devel-
oping low- and moderate-income housing in the Chicago metropoli-
tan area, sued the Village of Arlington Heights on the ground that its
failure to rezone fifteen acres near the center of town for multiple-
family use was racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Fair Housing Act of
1968.11 The fifteen-acre parcel was owned by a religious order and
used for a school and church. Much of the site was open space. While
the federal district court held for the Village, 2 the Federal Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the ultimate
effect of the refusal to rezone was racially discriminatory and there-
fore violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion.13 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court,
holding that a showing of discriminatory intent was necessary to es-
tablish a constitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause and that such intent was clearly lacking
from the record before the district court. The Supreme Court then
remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to deter-
mine whether the Village's conduct violated the Fair Housing Act.' 4
On remand, the court of appeals decided that Arlington Heights
had a continuing obligation under the Fair Housing Act to refrain
from zoning policies that foreclosed construction of low-income hous-
ing. Therefore, the case was remanded to the district court with di-
rection to require Arlington Heights to identify a parcel of land
within its boundaries properly zoned and suitable for low-income
housing or be found in violation of the aforesaid Act. 5 The district
court was soon advised by the parties that settlement negotiations
were about to produce a solution to be memorialized in a consent
decree.
B. The Consent Decree and the Rights of Intervenors
The consent decree entered by the district court was between the
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, discussed in Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1007 (7th Cir.
1980).
12. Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The district court held that
Arlington Heights was not motivated by racial discrimination or intent to discriminate against
low-income groups when they denied rezoning to MHDC, but rather by a desire to protect
property values and the integrity of the Village's zoning plan. Id. at 211.
13. Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1975).
14. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
15. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
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Village of Arlington Heights and MHDC. Basically, it required the
Village to annex property on its southern boundary and zone it to
conform to MHDC's plans for low-income housing, together with
commercial use, by an independent developer. Both the annexation
and the rezoning were to take place within sixty days of the entry of
the decree. The Village was also obligated to provide sewer and water
to the subject property.'6
The property subject to the consent decree was bordered by the
nearby Village of Mount Prospect. Mount Prospect moved to inter-
vene in the proceedings before the district court in order to object to
the consent decree, claiming the court lacked authority to enter the
consent decree and contending that the decree would be unjust and
inequitable because of its potential effect on the citizens of Mount
Prospect.17 Meanwhile, Arlington Heights, after hearing and notice,
approved the decree at a public meeting. The court then gave Mount
Prospect permission to intervene as a representative of its citizens.
The court also permitted intervention by various homeowners as-
sociations and nearby residents in Mount Prospect and then con-
ducted three days of hearings on their objections. 8
Objectors argued that the course of conduct followed by Arling-
ton Heights in approving the consent decree deprived them of their
rights to procedural due process. Because some regular procedures
were omitted, they argued that under Illinois law, the Village was
without power to assent to the decree because of those omissions in
zoning and annexation procedures. 9
Citing the federal courts' policies favoring the compromise settle-
ment of cases20 and congressional policy favoring open housing, the
court specifically held that "a court can exercise its full equitable
powers, even as against third parties, when a consent decree is filed
by the original parties." 2'
The court also rejected the argument that normal zoning proce-
dures required by Arlington Heights zoning ordinance should have
been followed. These procedures consisted of formal and informal
meetings between the developer and the Village staff, meetings with
16. Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836, 869-72 (N.D. 111. 1979).
17. Id. at 843.
18. Id. at 848.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 844 n.7.
21. 469 F. Supp. at 852 (noting that the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit holds other-
wise: Southridge Plastics Div. v. Local 759, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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the Plan Commission and one of its committees, and a hearing before
the Village Board.22 While freely noting that the Village did not fol-
low these procedures, the court set up against them "the broad pow-
ers of the Federal courts in enforcing settlement decrees. '23 Even
though the court suspected in a footnote that the consent decree pro-
cess might be used to provide relief not specifically sought in com-
plaints,24 the court suggested that the equity power of the court
would control.
Finally, as to the due process arguments raised by intervenors,
the court agreed that they had a legal interest in the annexation and
rezoning process and that some due process was therefore appropri-
ate - but not necessarily as set out in Arlington Heights ordinance.
The court noted the full three-day hearing before it on the merits of
intervenors' objections and concluded it could not say that additional
hearings before the Village and right of appeal to state courts there-
from would have substantially affected the accuracy of the truth-
finding process. Therefore, considering the added burden on the par-
ties, "the balance weighs heavily against the requested procedures. '25
This was particularly true given the projected additional costs to
MHDC, the likely defeat of the public interest in open housing, and
the federal policy favoring settlement of legal controversies in whole,
rather than through multiple litigation that would result if the an-
nexation and zoning matters were separated out of this complex
case.
Intervenors appealed, but the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
district court,27 and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to take up the
matter.2 ' Observing that national and local interests were now al-
igned rather than conflicting, the court of appeals noted the increas-
ing prevalence of site-specific relief in the form of court judgments
and decrees opening up specific parcels to low- and moderate-income
housing.2" The court then declared that the consent decree, rather
than displacing the powers of local government entities, simply pro-
vided such site-specific relief with the consent of the affected Village
22. Id. at 844 n.6.
23. Id. at 854.
24. Id. at 854 n.19.
25. Id. at 862.
26. 469 F. Supp. at 862.
27. Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980).
28. Arlington Heights, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
29. 616 F.2d at 1011.
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rather and not over its opposition. Relying in part on the importance
of resolving housing disputes but also on "the clear policy in favor of
encouraging settlements . . . , particularly in the area where volun-
tary compliance by the parties over an extended period will contrib-
ute significantly toward ultimate achievement of statutory goals,
30
the court held:
The trial court in approving a settlement need not inquire into
the precise legal rights of the parties nor reach and resolve the mer-
its of the claims or controversy, but need only determine that the
settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable and appropriate under the
particular facts and that there has been valid consent by the con-
cerned parties ...objectors must be given reasonable notice and
their objections heard and considered.1
This last requirement had clearly been satisfied because the in-
tervenors were given three days to present their objections to the
court below:
Assuming that some due process applies, the question is what
process is due. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands .. . .The weighing
and analysis of the many interests involved in this case against the
private interests of the intervenors . . . confirms the district court's
conclusion that the intervenors received all the process that was
due.32
The court considered and rejected the intervenors' reliance on an
Illinois appellate court decision reversing a consent decree where it
was unclear whether the local government had in fact approved the
settlement, where the unit of government was not "home rule," and
where fair housing violations were not involved.3 As appears in the
discussion below, this raises some question about the use of the con-
sent decree in nonfederal cases in which the fully approved consent
decree requires a local government to do an act in a manner substan-
tively and/or procedurally different from statutory requirements and
where housing policy is not involved.
How strong is the policy favoring settlement of disputes, stand-
ing alone? Can only federal courts impose procedures or even sub-
stance by consent decree, when the procedure or substance is differ-
30. Id. at 1014.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 1015.
33. Martin v. City of Greenville, 369 N.E.2d 543 (Ill. App. 3d 1977).
[Vol. XXI
Consent Decrees
ent from that required by statute, so long as the substance or
procedure is somewhere provided in the court proceedings? The re-
mainder of this Article is devoted to these questions.
III. CONFLICT WITH STATUTES AND ORDINANCES: CAN
PARTIES AGREE TO BYPASS LEGAL PROCEDURES BY
MEANS OF CONSENT DECREES?
The Arlington Heights litigation clearly sanctioned the use of the
consent decree to bypass local zoning and annexation requirements
and to end complex and lengthy litigation over alleged discrimination
in housing.3 4 Two sets of issues are raised by this aspect of these de-
cisions. First, is this as widespread as the federal courts in Illinois
indicate, and are there subject-matter or other limitations on such a
use of the consent decree? Second, do state courts also sanction the
use of consent decrees to take short cuts through statutory or ordi-
nance procedures in the zoning and environmental law areas?
As discussed below, the answers appear to be yes, possibly, and
sometimes. The consent decree is successfully applied in other cir-
cuits to modify state and local land use and environmental laws.
However, in most instances, the matter before the court is discrimi-
nation in housing or some other constitutional issue. State courts do
not often permit the use of the consent decree to get around state
and local land use and environmental laws, but there are states that
do.
A. Federal Courts and the Consent Decree Modifying State and
Local Land Use/Environmental Laws
Some federal courts apparently have no qualms about using the
consent decree to settle constitutional housing discrimination and en-
vironmental litigation, even if the decree requires local government
to act outside of, or contrary to, their state statutory authority and/or
local ordinances and regulations. One of the clearest post-Arlington
Heights examples comes from New Jersey, a state that otherwise
puts substantial limits upon the use in state courts of consent decrees
that modify state and local laws. In Mesalic v. Slayton, 5 the actions
of a local government allegedly were designed to thwart a land-
owner's plans to develop his property, thereby unlawfully depriving
34. See supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
35. 689 F. Supp. 416 (D.N.J. 1988).
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him of his property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution."6 The parties negotiated and exe-
cuted a consent decree for the purpose of ending the litigation, the
pertinent part of which reads:
All the named parties agree to comply in good faith with, and to
cooperate and proceed diligently, fairly and in good faith under, now
existing Jefferson Township Ordinances .. .and under state and
federal law, with respect to the preparation, submission, informal
and formal review, and amendment (if necessary) of plaintiff's forth-
coming subdivision(s) and other documents for the development of
plaintiff's Jefferson Township parcels of real property.3 7
Eight months later, and two weeks before declaring plaintiff
landowner's plans and applications for development permission com-
plete, the local government adopted amendments to its zoning ordi-
nance. Two months later, it based a rejection of plaintiff's develop-
ment plans on these amendments.
The court held that "the literal terms of paragraph eight do pro-
hibit the defendants from applying new ordinances to plaintiff's de-
velopment" and that, therefore, its terms "require defendants to pro-
cess plaintiff's application under township ordinances existing at the
time of the agreement."38 The local government argued that the con-
sent decree was unenforceable because local governments in New
Jersey lacked the authority to agree not to apply future ordinances
without a resolution or ordinance to that effect, even if embodied in a
consent decree. The court responded that the cases cited by defend-
ants in support of this proposition involved only state law and ad-
dressed only the relationship between state statutory law and consent
decrees based on state claims. Here, on the other hand, "the enforce-
ability of paragraph eight depends on whether the court had jurisdic-
tion to order the relief contained therein. Jurisdiction existed if the
plaintiff's federal claims were colorable and if the relief was fairly
designed to cure the constitutional violations."3 9 Thus, the consent
decree, "being based on colorable allegations of federal constitutional
violations, overrides any state law to the contrary.'40 Clearly the
court emphasized the judicial decree rather than the contractual na-
36. Id. at 418.
37. Id. at 419.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
40. 689 F. Supp. at 422 (emphasis added).
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ture of the consent decree in this case.'1
A federal district court in Pennsylvania came to the same con-
clusion in Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania.42 However, the court did not address
the fact that the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a statute prohib-
iting the funding of a consent decree mandating an auto emissions
and inspection program to satisfy Clean Air Act requirements, even
though the court recognized that "[i]t is well settled that a state law
which purports to nullify or prevent compliance with a federal judi-
cial decree is unconstitutional and without effect.' 3
The court relied on a subsequently overruled decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court 4 that implied a federal court "lacks the power under
our federalist system to countermand the decision of a state legisla-
ture not to expend state funds on the . . . program.' 45 Instead, the
Court found the state in civil contempt for failure to comply with the
consent decree and directed the U.S. Secretary for the Department of
Transportation to reject projects or grants for highway projects in the
Pittsburgh or Philadelphia areas except for safety or mass transit
purposes.46
The federal housing case of Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of
Yonkers47 is similar. There, a consent decree settled housing discrim-
ination litigation, requiring the city to initiate compulsory purchase
proceedings within sixty days, requiring the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to review the site and so-
licit proposals for public housing, and requiring construction to pro-
ceed forthwith.48 To the objection by one of the parties that the de-
cree avoided statutory compulsory purchase procedures, the court
responded that there was an exception in the statute from such pro-
cedures in the event of an emergency in the public interest, that the
record amply supported a finding of such an emergency, and that, in
any event, there had been adequate procedure in court pursuant to
the consent decree. The court held substantially the same with re-
41. Id. at 419.
42. 533 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa.), afi'd, 678 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1982).
43. 533 F. Supp. at 878.
44. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
45. 533 F. Supp. at 878.
46. Id. at 881-82.
47. 858 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
48. 858 F.2d at 859.
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spect to lack of compliance with state environmental assessment
laws, noting that again there was some ground for a statutory excep-
tion given the nature of the proposed project.49
A somewhat different result, though not directly contrary, was
reached by the Third Circuit in the low-income housing case of Soci-
ety Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris.50 There, a homeowners' association
challenged a consent decree that provided for the financing and con-
struction of low-income housing in their relatively exclusive residen-
tial neighborhood, in part on the ground that such new housing
would not comply with applicable single-family zoning regulations.
However, the gravamen of the complaint was not that the decree
would force violation of local zoning per se, but that HUD's own reg-
ulations provided that preliminary proposals for new construction
must include evidence that such proposed construction is permissible
under applicable zoning ordinances or regulations. 1
The court held that "[t]he consent decree itself could not, and
does not, specifically authorize HUD to fund housing that does not
comply with the local zoning ordinances." ' This raises the question
of what is special about HUD regulations that insulates them from
consent decrees if local laws are not so insulated. Indeed, the court
gives a cryptic answer in the same paragraph:
Had the above regulation never been promulgated, then, we
might well be inclined to conclude that the Association's complaint
as to this issue was not ripe for adjudication at this time. Such an
issue could more properly be determined only after the plans for the
housing were finally approved, so that any inconsistency between
the plans and the zoning code could be demonstrated.5 3
What is the court saying? Is it simply addressing the ripeness
issue given the procedural aspects of the case? (The Association suc-
cessfully appealed motions to dismiss from the court below.) Or is it
49. Id. at 866-68. See also Knoll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
(ordering a property tax increase in order to fund an improvement that was part of a consent
decree settling building code violations); Affiliated Realty & Management Co. v. City of High-
wood, No. 87c 10170 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 1989) (Without dealing with the merits of the consent
decree, the court noted that a decree suspended the creation of one commercial zoning district
and restored the application of the original district to the landowner's property all apparently
without the usual hearings and notice that accompany local zoning changes).
50. 632 F.2d 1045 (3d Cir. 1980).
51. Id. at 1057.
52. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
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signalling that consent decrees may not order actions that conflict
with local zoning, even in housing discrimination cases?
At least one court is quite clear. In Gautreaux v. Landrieu,54 a
federal district court in Illinois held that "HUD may not . . 'force
suburban governments to submit public housing proposals to HUD
nor displace the rights and powers accorded local government entities
under federal or state housing statutes.' "" The above was dicta in a
dispute over the extent to which a consent decree could require an
Illinois agency to undertake certain actions.
Taking a slightly different tack, the Federal Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Citizens for a Better Environment v.
Gorsuch56 held that a consent decree can limit the discretion of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) just as a judgment
could. In denying a motion to vacate a consent decree settling com-
plex toxic waste and other litigation arising under the Clean Water
Act, the court rejected the argument that the decree, by directing the
Administrator of the EPA to do certain "nonstatutory" acts, was im-
permissibly limiting its discretion. The court noted that a trial court
need not inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor re-
solve all the claims of the parties in entering a consent decree (which
the court reiterated was a judicial act) in order to avoid protracted
litigation and accomplish a voluntary settlement of civil controver-
sies.5 7 Even though the decree directed the EPA to promulgate cer-
tain regulations, this was not an impermissible infringement. 8
Parenthetically, it would seem clear that a state court cannot
bind an agency of the federal government by consent decree in envi-
ronmental or any other litigation any more than a state court deci-
sion could do so. Indeed, a federal court has so held: a state court
consent decree that vacated a state implementation plan required
under the Clean Air Act and approved by the EPA does not preclude
federal enforcement of such a plan. 9
It is equally clear that a state supreme court cannot vacate a
federal consent decree. In Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
54. 523 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
55. Id. at 670 (quoting Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 306 (1976)).
56. 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
57. 718 F.2d at 1125-26.
58. Id. at 1127.




Clean Air v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,0 the state moved to
vacate a consent decree requiring it to implement a statewide vehicle
inspection and maintenance program under the Clean Air Act. The
court of appeals held that the consent decree was res judicata on
Pennsylvania in state court actions challenging the authority of state
officials to enter into such a decree. As the concurring judge put it, on
pure federalism principles:
The state's order is untenable not only because the prior federal
order was res judicata, which it was, but because a state has no
power to disturb any federal decree. This conclusion flows necessa-
rily from the constitutional principles that structure "Our Federal-
ism" and most particularly from the supremacy clause. State courts
are "destitute of all power" to interfere with the proceedings or de-
cisions of the national courts.8 '
The same court in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. EPA62
held that the federal government could constitutionally require the
states to pass legislation establishing a regulatory program to enforce
the Clean Air Act.6 3 Largely to the same effect, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Spallone v. United States4 that a city must pass legis-
lation to which it agreed in a consent decree. 5
Other environmental cases appear to approve limitation of state
actions based on promises made in a consent decree without address-
ing the issue of conflict with state and local law. Thus, in City of Las
Vegas v. Clark County,6 the Ninth Circuit noted with apparent ap-
proval that "[t]he Consent Decree provides no guarantee against the
State promulgating effluent limitations that are not more strin-
gent. ' 87 The implication is that the state was bound by the terms of
the consent decree to keep from promulgating less stringent regula-
tions. The court observed that although a consent decree has attrib-
utes of both a contract and a judicial act, it is "construed with refer-
ence to ordinary contract principles."6 8
On the other hand, in another fair housing case, the Sixth Cir-
60. 755 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1985).
61. Id. at 45 (Stern, J., concurring).
62. 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974).
63. Id. at 262-63.
64. 487 U.S. 1251 (1988).
65. Id. at 1258-60.
66. 755 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1985).




cuit in Dotson v. United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development,"9 wrote considerable dicta on the "unique properties"
of a consent decree even though it had previously held that consent
decrees basically should be construed as contracts. The court con-
cluded that it is the consent decree that governs "the behavior of the
parties during the life of the decree. '7 0 This implies perhaps a differ-
ent standard for those decrees that call for ongoing supervision by
the court and those that do not. This theme is picked up by federal
courts dealing with the question of intervention and the rights of
third parties following the entry of a consent decree, which is dis-
cussed in Part IV of this Article.
B. State Courts and Consent Decrees:
Conflict with State/Local Laws
State courts appear less likely to permit consent decrees that ad-
versely affect local zoning and environmental laws. Perhaps the lead-
ing case in the field is the previously noted Illinois case of Martin v.
City of Greenville.7' There, a "settlement order" permitting a land-
owner to construct multiple-family units in a single-family district
was struck down for failure to comply with hearing and notice re-
quirements of both the city zoning ordinance and the State of Illinois
zoning enabling legislation. 2 As before observed, the city was bound
by that legislation as a non-home rule municipality, and there was
substantial question about the city council's having agreed to the
"oral" settlement in the first place. Nevertheless, the court's language
is unqualified:
In the case at bar, the foregoing statutory and ordinance re-
quirements were not met by the attempted settlement agreement.
Consequently, the city council members acted beyond their author-
ity, either individually or collectively, in attempting to amend the
Greenville Zoning Ordinance .... A municipality may not, under
the guise of compromise, impair a public duty owed to it, and
neither the municipal officials nor the trial court may usurp the leg-
islative process.78
Illinois has retreated somewhat from this position in two other
69. 731 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 318.
71. 369 N.E.2d 543 (Ill. App. 3d 1977). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
72. Id. at 545.
73. Id. at 545-46.
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appellate cases. Neither retreat, however, came from the district that
rendered the Greenville decision. In Chicago Title & Trust Company
v. Village of Mount Prospect,74 the court held that a collateral attack
upon a consent decree by a non-party could not be based on the fail-
ure of Mount Prospect to follow its own zoning procedures notwith-
standing the language in the Greenville case.75 This was so because
the enacted ordinances were at best voidable, rather than void, and
the Greenville court did not consider that issue because in Greenville
the attack was a direct one on the consent decree. In this case, a
municipality near Mount Prospect collaterally attacked a consent de-
cree that provided for a large residential development on land bor-
dering both municipalities but which was to be annexed to Mount
Prospect. While homeowners' associations were permitted to inter-
vene, the recently incorporated municipal corporation of Prospect
Heights was not. Prospect Heights objected to the zoning of the
property for residential use on the ground that, because it was ac-
complished pursuant to consent decree, the hearing and notice provi-
sions of the Mount Prospect zoning ordinance were ignored.
While this is a fairly technical holding, it nonetheless indicates a
reluctance by at least one other appellate district in Illinois to en-
force the Greenville decision limiting consent decrees. The court
chose to let stand the zoning accomplished through the consent de-
cree even though it might be "voidable" under direct attack by a
party to the litigation.76
The Illinois Court of Appeals for the Second District also upheld
a town planning decision by consent decree, although nothing indi-
cates that local procedures were properly followed. In Gary- Wheaton
Bank v. Village of Lombard," the court held that a consent decree
approving a subdivision plat consisting of five lots and allowing con-
struction thereon of two-family residences was not invalid. In sum,
the majority of Illinois courts are not striking down consent decrees
that zone or grant development approval even absent the normally
required hearing and notice procedures that are otherwise required.
74. 513 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. App. 3d 1987).
75. Id. at 918-19.
76. Id. But see Ad-Ex, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 565 N.E.2d 669, 678 (Il. App. 3d 1991),
where the same court has recently described a consent decree as "merely the court's recorda-
tion of the private agreement of the parties" and "not a judicial determination of the rights of
the parties" which differs from the federal view expressed in the cases discussed in this Article
and denigrates the value and substance of such decrees.
77. 404 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill. App. 3d 1980).
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Nevertheless, further reluctance to permit consent decrees to
modify local land use law is reflected in PMC Realty Trust v. Town
of Derry.78 There, a consent decree permitted the use of land for
which a variance had been denied, resulting in an appeal. However,
before the landowner could take advantage of the consent decree, the
town amended its zoning ordinance to prohibit the use altogether.
Claiming that the consent decree vested the landowner's right to con-
struct the proposed multiple-family housing, the court held: "A town
may exercise its zoning authority only in accordance with applicable
statutes. . . .The town may not bargain away this delegated author-
ity, even under the form of a consent judgment. '79
The court relied in part on the New Jersey case of Midtown
Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison,0 where the court refused
to enforce a consent decree entered by a developer. The township
provided that the developer need only comply with the township's
then-existing ordinances and regulations. However, the township re-
fused to approve plaintiff's final subdivision application stating that
"where a [zoning statute] sets forth procedure to be followed, no gov-
erning body, or subdivision thereof, has the power to adopt any other
method of procedure." 8' Furthermore, the court held that the de-
fendants had no authority to exempt plaintiff from the township's
procedures for filing and approval of his plan or to surrender, as
stated in the consent decree, their "inherent power, right and duty to
keep their zoning and planning ordinances mutable by making neces-
sary amendments or changes for the benefits of the public." 2
To the contrary is the Colorado case of City of Boulder v. Sher-
relwood, Inc..8 3 There, in settlement of Boulder's claim that the land-
owner's planned development approvals had expired and the grant-
ing of an extension would violate subsequently passed land use and
environmental ordinances, the parties signed and a court entered a
consent decree that declared the planned development approvals
valid and permitted the landowner to proceed with the planned de-
78. 480 A.2d 51 (N.H. 1984).
79. Id. at 53.
80. 172 A.2d 40 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1961).
81. Id. at 45-46.
82. Id. at 45. See also Mesalic v. Slayton, 689 F. Supp. 416 (D.N.J. 1988) where, in dicta,
the court noted that "[o]ther [New Jersey] cases have also held that agreements between mu-
nicipalities and landowners are void if they attempt to circumvent the requirements of the
state zoning statute." Id. at 420.
83. 604 P.2d 686 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
1992]
Stetson Law Review
velopment subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court. Boulder
then sought to apply certain subsequently enacted floodplain regula-
tions despite language in the consent decree that stated the planned
development was to be "subject to all land use and floodplain regula-
tions of the Plaintiff City of Boulder in effect as of May 1, 1969, but
free of any such regulation adopted by the City of Boulder subse-
quent to May 1, 1969." ' The court held that "[t]o the extent that
the consent decree was a judgment of the trial court, this language
rendered the floodplain issue res judicata. ' '85
At least one other state case dealing with federal environmental
law appears also to reflect the position that state statutes are inferior
to consent decrees in environmental cases. In Occidental Chemical
Corp. v. Department of Environmental Conservation,6 a New York
intermediate court of appeal held that a consent decree issued in fed-
eral court took precedence over a later-enacted state statute.8 7 The
consent decree, issued in settlement of United States v. Hooker
Chemicals and Plastics Corp.," provided that, in exchange for a site
owner's undertaking certain activities to clean up a hazardous dump
site, it would be released by all governmental parties from all future
claims under health and environmental statutes arising out of activi-
ties the site owner was required to undertake in compliance with the
consent decree.8 9
Shortly thereafter, the New York legislature enacted a fee sys-
tem to provide for recovery from regulated entities a portion of cer-
tain expenses for administering certain regulatory programs, includ-
ing hazardous waste. Some of the activities the site owner was
required to undertake under the aforementioned consent decree were
included in that fee system.90 The court held that the department
could not charge such fees, even though authorized and required to
do so by New York statute, because the consent decree immunized
the site owner from such fees as would attach to those activities cov-
ered in the statute that were also required by the consent decree. 1
In sum, consent decrees appear likely to fare better in federal
84. Id. at 689.
85. Id.
86. 499 N.Y.S.2d 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
87. Id. at 225.
88. 540 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
89. 499 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 225.
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court than in state court. However, there are state courts that will
confer the same kind of superior status on consent decrees by empha-
sizing the judicial decree rather than the contractual nature of the
beast. It would also appear that the pendulum is swinging in favor of
using such decrees even if some formal process is lost, so long as
there is some process in the judicial proceedings.
IV. THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES: COLLATERAL
ATTACK AND DUE PROCESS
While the rights of non-parties to the litigation can obviously be
affected in a variety of forums, it is in federal courts that the issues
arise most commonly. This is apparently so for two reasons. First,
third parties are fond of alleging that their loss of procedural rights
rises to a deprivation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Second, Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for third party intervention in fed-
eral litigation, provided it is "timely. ''9 2 As one commentator has ob-
served, the effect is to bar a collateral attack on a judgment entered
by consent decree if a third party has been denied intervention for
lack of timeliness. This has at least two effects: (1) it limits the third
party's choice of forum to that proceeding in which the consent de-
cree is entered, and (2) it requires that a third party act quickly or
the request will not be "timely." 93
As to the matter of due process, the Arlington Heights case
makes clear that not every denial of intervention results in a denial
of due process, and hearings before courts may well substitute for
hearings before local boards, commissions, and legislative bodies. Af-
ter all, due process requires only that every litigant have an opportu-
nity to be heard. The choice of forum is not necessarily or even usu-
ally that of the litigant/party, at least in terms of satisfying due
process.94 Moreover, excessive intervention can lead to expensive and
extended litigation, the very evil that the consent decree is designed
to prevent. As the federal district court judge in Kelley v. Thomas
Solvent Co.95 observed in denying amici leave to intervene in a Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) proceeding already involving ninety parties:
92. Kramer, supra note 1, at 332.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 338-39.
95. 717 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
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I see no reason to subvert the very purpose of this settlement
agreement, which is to avoid the costs of extended litigation, by or-
dering a hearing on whether the settlement represents the percent-
age of responsibility that would be adjudicated against Grand Trunk
if this case were tried. The amici ask this Court to allow nearly a
year of discovery for them to prepare themselves adequately. All
this, from my perspective, serving to further increase the costs of
litigation - perhaps for no reason and by those who are not even
parties in this case.98
A. Due Process and the Federal Courts
As noted above, most due process claims involving consent de-
crees arise in federal courts, as the Arlington Heights litigation amply
demonstrates. Another example, again involving housing, comes from
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Society Hill Civic Ass'n
v. Harris.97 Recall that the plaintiff in this case sought to intervene to
protect property values in a Philadelphia neighborhood where HUD
and the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (RDA) proposed to
construct multi-family low-income housing. Other intervenors were
tenants that would be at least temporarily displaced while their
buildings were renovated. The Association challenged the various
consent decrees settling the litigation between the to-be-evicted te-
nants and HUD and the RDA on a variety of grounds.9 8
A principal claim of the Association was that it was entitled to
collaterally attack the consent decrees because it was a denial of due
process to be bound by a judgment of proceedings in which it had not
participated. The court of appeals agreed. Noting that the Associa-
tion had not been permitted to intervene in the litigation resulting in
the consent decrees and that the lower court had not retained juris-
diction (thereby making direct intervention now impossible), the
court found that "due process demands that the Association be al-
lowed its challenge, and that the district court erred in precluding
it."99 The court observed that if it had failed to intervene earlier be-
cause of tardiness, for example, they might very well be barred from
collateral attack here. 100 But this was not the case. Indeed, the key is
96. Id. at 519.
97. 632 F.2d 1045 (3d Cir. 1980).
98. Id. at 1049.
99. Id. at 1051.
100. Id. at 1053.
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contained in a lengthy footnote making crystal clear the importance
of permitting intervention in order to preserve a consent decree
against later collateral attack on due process grounds:
If the property owners had been allowed to intervene in
Salvitti, and had received a full and fair adjudication on the merits
of the issues raised by the Association here, it is quite possible that
the Association would be precluded from the present suit by the res
judicata effect of the prior adjudication. This is so because res judi-
cata is frequently extended to those in "privity" with the parties to
the suit, or to those whose interests were fully and fairly represented
by the parties. Thus we do not claim, as the dissent contends, that
the Association escapes the res judicata bar simply because it was
not a party to the Salvitti suit. Rather, we conclude that the Associ-
ation is not barred by res judicata because the other property own-
ers were denied intervention and did not have an adjudication on
the merits of the issues raised by the plaintiffs in this case. There-
fore, the district court in the present case adjudicated the Associa-
tion's legal rights on the basis of a prior suit in which the Associa-
tion's interests went entirely unrepresented. 101
The critical importance of permitting parties to participate if
they are to be bound is reiterated in Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh.10 2
There the court of appeals held that, while a consent decree is indeed
a judgment, it does not bind or preclude claims of non-parties who
had been given no opportunity to present their claims in court.'0
The federal environmental law cases are split on both the right
to intervene and the effect of a consent decree on those who have
sought and been denied intervention. Standing for the traditional
view is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in County of
Orange v. Air California.'°4 Shortly before the entry of a consent de-
cree settling National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) litigation
between Orange County, the City of Newport Beach, and several citi-
zens' groups in which the adequacy of the environmental impact
statement concerning future airport development was challenged, the
City of Irvine sought and was denied permission to intervene. Both
101. Id. at 1050 n.4 (citations omitted).
102. 811 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1987).
103. Id. at 181. See also Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 798 F.2d 389
(10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987), where Indian tribal members not ade-
quately represented by Board of Indian Affairs with respect to their oil-producing lands were
permitted to set aside consent decree and litigate on the merits.
104. 799 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
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the trial and appellate courts held that the motion to intervene
(made just before settlement and after five years of litigation) was
not timely. The court observed that the consent decree had been pre-
ceded by extensive and well-publicized negotiations. 10 5 However, the
court also held "that Irvine is not precluded by stare decisis, collat-
eral estoppel, or res judicata from taking other action . . . (consent
decrees - products of negotiation rather than contested litigation -
are not likely to carry stare decisis effects measurably adverse to the
proposed intervention in any future proceedings).' ' 1°6
A similar position was taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp..107 Shortly before the entry of a consent decree settling Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and CERCLA en-
forcement actions for the cleanup of hazardous waste dumping sites,
and after the district court had heard extensive public comments
from it and others, the court denied the motion of the Indiana Public
Interest Research Group (InPIRG) to intervene on the ground that it
was not timely. 0 8 After agreeing with the trial court that the motions
were filed too late in the proceedings, the court observed that if In-
PIRG were allowed to intervene "there can be no consent decree ab-
sent InPIRG's agreement. . . . Thus the lengthy and difficult nego-
tiation process in which the present parties participated would be
wasted."' 0 9 The court further emphasized that InPIRG had had am-
ple opportunity to present its views:
Thus, it is difficult to understand why InPIRG should be al-
lowed to intervene in the present case for the purpose of presenting
its views on the consent decree to the court after it had already been
afforded an opportunity to do so. Because InPIRG has already had
an opportunity to present its views to the district court, it would
suffer little prejudice if it were denied permission to intervene at
this late stage in the proceedings. 110
A somewhat different conclusion was reached by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in National Wildlife Federation v.
Gorsuch."' Emphasizing the judicial decree nature of a consent de-
105. 799 F.2d at 538.
106. Id. at 538-39.
107. 824 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1987).
108. Id. at 533.
109. Id. at 536.
110. Id. at 537.
111. 744 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1984).
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cree rather than its contractual nature, the court denied the right of
third parties to collaterally attack a consent decree even though they
had been denied permission to intervene in the proceedings. In an
action to prevent the dumping of sewage sludge into the ocean con-
trary to the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, the
National Wildlife Federation (NWF) did not intervene but rather
worked "behind the scenes" with the EPA. Not until the parties were
in the midst of settlement negotiations did NWF seek to intervene in
the litigation. Their motion was denied, and they did not appeal.'12
The court of appeals noted that while a third party who is denied
leave to intervene is in a different posture than a party seeking to
collaterally attack a judgment, nevertheless under certain conditions
such a collateral attack should be barred:
Preclusion of a third person from collateral attack on a consent
decree to which he was not a party is a step to be taken cautiously
and only in unusual circumstances. The factors present here are
not typical and emphasize the narrowness of our holding. In sum:(1) plaintiffs were aware of both suits, knew that their interests
were at stake, and monitored both actions closely;
(2) the two suits were inextricably intertwined in that the stat-
ute, regulations, and dumping area at issue were identical;
(3) the New York case was adjudicated in an adversary proceed-
ing and the plaintiffs chose not to file a motion to intervene, even
for the purpose of appeal when it became obvious that E.P.A. would
not seek appellate review;
(4) plaintiffs filed an amicus brief in the New Jersey suit rather
than attempting to timely present the same issues as intervenors;
(5) plaintiffs failed to appeal the denial of their motions for in-
tervention in the New Jersey action; and
(6) the New Jersey consent decrees established only interim re-
lief, rather than final resolution of the questions at issue, and pro-
vided for administrative proceedings in which plaintiffs could
participate. '13
A similar result was reached by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in United States v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.."
There, the City of Cleveland sought to intervene during a public
comment period upon a proposed consent decree between the steel
company and the United States settling litigation over alleged viola-
112. Id. at 965-66.
113. Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
114. 804 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1986).
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tions of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.11 5 Cleveland sought
reimbursement for its negotiating efforts and for the adverse effects
on quality of life in the city. Reversing the trial court, the appellate
court found no basis for Cleveland's demands, in the absence of any
other pleadings and evidence, because they were for all practical pur-
poses voluntary services. Cleveland was asserting an independent
claim for a share of the money awarded as part of the consent decree
without any basis and, therefore, lacked the right to intervene or at-
tack the decree.116 On the other hand, federal courts have occasion-
ally permitted intervention as late as the partial consent decree pro-
cess if the court becomes convinced that the intervening party was
adequately represented up until the time of a proposed settlement by
the original parties. For example, in In re Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor,"7 the court permitted intervention to contest a pro-
posed consent decree by the Natural Wildlife Federation (NWF)
three and one-half years after CERCLA litigation commenced over
PCB disposal. The court felt that NWF "apparently believed the set-
tlement to be a betrayal" and "then moved promptly to intervene."118
Of course, most courts agree that the right to intervention does not
carry with it any right to block a consent decree agreed to by the
principal parties, particularly if they have had an adequate opportu-
nity to object. 9
B. State Cases and the Rights of Third Parties
Cases dealing with state due process/collateral estoppel issues
are few and far between. Morris County Fair Housing Council v.
Boonton Township120 deals tangentially with the subject. In settle-
ment of a so-called Mt. Laurel claim (developer alleging that by fail-
ing to zone his land for multiple-family housing, a local government
is failing to meet its fair share of regional low- and moderate-income
housing needs), the defendant local government and one of the devel-
115. Id. at 349.
116. Id. at 352.
117. 712 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Mass. 1989).
118. Id. at 1023.
119. United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
"It is well settled that '[t]he right to have its objections heard does not, of course, give the
intervenor the right to block any settlement to which it objects.' "Id. at 1083 (quoting Zipes v.
TWA, 455 U.S. 385, 392 (1982) (quoting Air Line Steward and Stewardesses Ass'n v. TWA, 630
F.2d 1164, 1169 (7th Cir. 1980))).
120. 484 A.2d 1302 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
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opers proposed to enter into a consent decree that would foreclose
the second developer from pursuing his Mt. Laurel remedy.121 Such a
consent decree would also bind non-party, lower-income persons. 122
While the courts in New Jersey "have long endorsed the policy of
encouraging the settlement of litigation,' ' 23 the court expressed great
concern over the potential for lowering the amount of low-income
housing in frustration of the Mt. Laurel doctrine:
The risks of improvidently approving a settlement and issuing a
judgment of compliance are most acute in Mount Laurel litigation
brought by developers. A plaintiff developer and defendant munici-
pality have complementary objectives in settlement negotiations
which are likely to result in an agreement which does not advance
the goals of Mount Laurel. A municipality's objective is to be as-
signed a small fair share of lower income housing. A developer's ob-
jective is to secure approval of his project. If a judgment of compli-
ance is entered approving a settlement which advances both of these
objectives, the result would be the construction of a small number of
lower income housing units while insulating the municipality from
further Mount Laurel litigation for six years. 124
Nevertheless, the court rejected the notion that a judgment of
compliance could only be entered after a full trial and held that the
court could enter such a judgment binding on parties with pending
actions as well as other parties, provided adequate notice and oppor-
tunity for further testimony is provided by the court.
25
V. CONCLUSION
The consent decree is an increasingly viable tool for settling
complex litigation in the land use and environmental law fields. As
the cases demonstrate, the consent decree is most prevalent and most
commonly accepted in litigation arising in the federal courts. The
federal courts also appear to be most likely to accept those aspects of
the consent decree that direct action outside of, if not in contraven-
tion of, state and local processes for dealing with the use of land.
This is particularly true in the fields of housing discrimination and
environmental law, but the interests of the federal courts in settling
121. Id. at 1304.
122. Id. at 1306.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1307.
125. Id. at 1310.
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any complex litigation appears also to be a compelling reason.
Recall that in 1955 when Justice Douglas penned his famous
opinion in Berman v. Parker,126 most commentators assumed that
the fast and loose treatment of the Public Purpose Clause of the
Fifth Amendment was limited to urban renewal cases. Then, a quar-
ter of a century later, Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous
court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,127 extended the con-
cept to eminent domain proceedings generally. In federal courts at
least, the consent decree genie is out of the bottle, as the environ-
mental cases demonstrate.
In state courts, the situation is by no means so clear. Many state
courts still refuse to permit the use of the consent decree to circum-
scribe state and local land use or environmental procedures. How-
ever, it is possible to explain away the difference solely on the basis
of separation of powers. State courts are coequal with the state legis-
lature, which, either directly or through local governments, sets out
certain provisions that the court is loath to tamper with through the
consent decree.
The matter of procedural due process rights of third parties is
murkier still, with both federal and state courts in disagreement over
whether such rights can be cut off. Clearly the courts should and do
require some measure of due process. But to the extent the affected
parties are permitted to intervene in court proceedings in a meaning-
ful fashion prior to the consent decree, then whether or not it is to
their liking, courts appear to be willing to cut off intervenors' rights
to collaterally attack the consent judgment that results, particularly
given the courts' predilection for ending complex and expensive
litigation.
The use of the consent decree to settle complex litigation thus
presents a problem and opportunity: the avoidance of complex and
lengthy town planning and environmental impact approvals. There is
theoretically little to prevent local government and landowner from
agreeing to settle litigation by means of a consent decree granting
approval of development without all the procedures and permits re-
quired by state or local law, including lengthy hearing requirements,
so long as due process rights of third parties are honored to some
extent in the judicial process.
This may be a salutary result where environmental impact and
126. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
127. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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land development regulations have grown in number and complexity
so as to unduly complicate and lengthen the land development pro-
cess for years and years. On the other hand, it behooves the courts to
take special care that they do not become an unwilling substitute for
local land use and environmental permit agencies simply for the sake
of convenience and expediency.

